| Here is the
second part on the CSIS.
A friend e-mailed me today about the
first article and he seemed surprised to
discover the organization’s mandate.
So, in order to build on yesterday’s
story, I will be looking at the CSIS ACT
in particular, including the
organization’s search and warrant
powers, and how they apply these powers.
[*#] indicates an endnote.
Just to set the tone, we must first
look at the concept of the state. In
theory, the state is the mechanism by
which people delegate power in order to
secure social and economic well-being
and to offer a sustainable level of
protection from internal and external
threats. Barry Buzen (1991:38)[*1]
states:
The paradox, of course, is that as
state power grows the state also becomes
a source of threat against the
individual. The stability of the state
derives not only from its centralizing
power, but also from the understanding
by its citizens that it is the lesser of
two evils (that is, that whatever
threats come from the state will be of a
lower order of magnitude than those
which would arise in its absence).
Is this the case? Is the state really
the lesser of two evils? Or, should we
be fearful of a monolithic power we
refer to as ‘the state’ and its
over-arching powers to curtail the
rights and freedoms of its citizens?
According to the CSIS Act (I refer to
the office consolidation version
entitled “Chapter C-23 Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act”),
Section 12 states:
"The Service shall collect, by
investigation or otherwise, to the
extent that is strictly necessary, and
analyse and retain information and
intelligence respecting activities that
may on reasonable grounds be suspected
of constituting threats to the security
of Canada and, in relation thereto,
shall report to and advise the
government of Canada."
As such, the CSIS can also develop
associations with both provincial
departments, police forces, or develop
an arrangement for the exchange of
information with foreign states. While
Section 13 indicates that the Service
may provide “security assessments”
to agencies on the federal and
provincial level, the Service is not
limited to assessments. Section 15
states that the Service may conduct
investigations “as are required for
the purpose of providing assessments.”
Moreover, Section 16 permits the Service
to collect information concerning
foreign states and persons or any
Canadian citizen, permanent resident, or
corporation “in relation to the
defence of Canada or the conduct of the
international affairs of Canada.”
There are very few limitations to these
investigative and assessment powers with
regards to defence issues and
international relations, the primary one
being authorization by the Minister of
Defence or Minister of Foreign
Affairs[*2].
As a federal organization concerned
with national security and intelligence
issues, the CSIS is primarily mandated,
under the ACT, to perform: (1) security
screening for all federal departments
with the exception of the RCMP and
Department of National Defence
(assessments are usually conducted for
employment with the government and
immigration and citizenship
applications)[*3]; (2) security and
threat assessments to appraise the
loyalty to Canada of an individual,
overall reliability of an individual as
it relates to government employees (i.e.
security clearance levels), and the
potential of an individual or group to
use violence against Canadians and the
government, etc.
The four areas of concern as outlined
under Section 12 of the ACT (i.e.
“constituting threats to the security
of Canada”) are as follows: (1)
espionage and sabotage (in other words
the unlawful collection of sensitive
political, social-economic,
scientific-technological, or military
information or an act that endangers the
safety or security of private or public
property); (2) foreign Influence
(activities that are controlled or
financed by outside sources); (3)
political violence and terrorism (from
external or internal sources and acts
that are directed against other
countries by Canadians); and (4)
subversion (activities meant to
overthrows Canada’s government by
violence). |
Now, the CSIS
states publicly that it does not have a
mandate to conduct covert foreign
intelligence operations (i.e.
clandestine activities outside of
Canada), but, as suggested yesterday,
the CSIS has a history of foreign
influence, including the attempt to
recruit foreign nationals. “The CSIS
Mandate”[*4] (pp. 4-5) states: “CSIS
does not have the mandate to conduct
foreign intelligence operations outside
of Canada. CSIS is a defensive, domestic
security service…. CSIS has liaison
officers in some countries. Liaison
officers are involved in the exchange of
security intelligence information which
concerns the threats to the security of
Canada. They are in no way involved in
offensive operations.”
I’m sure you can draw some
conclusions from this.
With regards to collecting
information, one may wonder what the
CSIS does and how they get permission.
Let’s look at the process for each
function:
Security Screening and Reliability
Checks require the following:
-
- Verification of personal data
and proof of identity
-
- Verification of education and
professional qualifications
-
- Reliability and loyalty checks
by interviewing previous employers
and references
-
- A check of criminal records
-
- A credit history check
-
- Fingerprint checks
For SS and RC functions, the
individual grants permission because she
or he is seeking employment, etc.
As for conducting threat assessments
and investigation concerns of espionage
and subversion (that is, for performing
counter-terrorism or
counter-intelligence duties), the CSIS
uses a number of methods that are
systematically applied according to the
levels of threat that an individual or
group (the threat) represents. For
instance, Wolfgang Droge was given a
Level 2 TARC [*5] rating by the CSIS in
the early 1990s and was likely increases
to TARC level 3 when physical
confrontations between the Heritage
Front and the ARA became more frequent.
The TARC levels are
as follows:
LEVEL 1 – investigators use
open sources such as newspaper articles,
police records, or other records held in
Canadian and foreign information banks.
Investigations are usually short-term of
no more than 60 days.
LEVEL 2 – investigators can
use more intrusive measures such as
interviews and physical surveillance.
Investigations are usually up to a year
in duration before being reviews.
LEVEL 3 – investigations
include the use of the most intrusive
measures and warrants for the removal
and collection of evidence that must be
granted by the Federal Court.
Investigations of this sort are
permitted for no more than one or two
years before a review is necessary.
Methods include: mail openings,
covert searches, human sources,
communications interception, the removal
(and replacement) of any equipment in a
defined area, the installation of
equipment for monitoring of the threat,
and clandestine operations such as the
placement of individuals in an
organization.
Tomorrow, we’ll look at recent
mistakes by the CSIS and complaints
against the Service. That is, if I’m
still around to write about it…
ENDNOTES
*1 Buzen, Barry. People, States, and
Fear: An Agenda for International
Security Studies in the Post Cold-war
Era. Lynne Rienner, Colorado: 1991 [2nd
Edition].
*2 CSIS ACT Limitation S.
16(2)(3)(a).
*3 Please note that the CSIS does not
perform security screening for the DND,
this is an internal function of the DND.
However, the CSIS does provide
information to the DND with regards to
national security and potential
intelligence threats (i.e. threat
assessments).
*4 www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/back1.ehtml
*5 LEVEL 2 is a designation given by
the Targeting Approval and Review
Committee, a quasi-independent committee
with representatives from the Service,
the Solicitor General’s office, and
the Department of Justice. TARC assesses
the validity of the investigation of a
threat and permits certain investigative
methods according to the seriousness of
the threat (i.e. the potential for
violence and harm).
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